Railway conversion is a pipe-dream.
17 December 2008
This article was prepared to respond to an article published in
“Public Service Review”, entitled “Road not rail?” by P.
Withrington. The claims made in that article are addressed below. The Journal
now cannot find space for the following.
The idea of railway conversion was originated in 1954 by Brigadier
Lloyd, who claimed that all rail passenger journeys required only 3,433 buses,
one at every station at any time, departing when full. There were 5,600
stations! Since then, most advocates avoided calculating bus fleets; none
produced timetables, nor staff rosters. All assume passengers transferring to
buses, when experience shows they prefer cars if lines close, parking problems
notwithstanding. Mr. Withrington ‘pleads for an in-depth examination of
the facts’. They have been examined many times.
In 1955, Sir David Robertson, MP, advocated converting the 161 mile
Inverness-Wick single-line railway to a road.[1] When closure was announced, he opposed
it! After much pleading by him [2] and local authorities, Transport Minster
Ernest Marples – a road contractor by profession – blocked closure
‘in the public interest’, but, as usual, declined to cover losses
– there was, then, no subsidy, only interest bearing loans
Lloyd’s concept was debated by the Institution of Civil
Engineering in April 1955. It was demolished by ten road and four rail experts,
being supported by only five.[3] Having read this in my book [4],
Withrington’s web-site declared that the ‘debate following the
original discussion lasted until 1958 in The Engineer’. His web-site
claims that ‘the railway lobby denies that a two-way road can exist,
whereas those who have seen a road know how effective roads are’, [sic].
Paradoxically, in comparing rail and road capacity, he excludes 200,000 miles
of such roads whilst including single-track railways. Those ‘ghost’
roads accommodate most hauliers, bus companies and factories, are used daily as
diversions for blocked trunk routes, and carry massive volumes of traffic
throughout. Without them there would be no road traffic. Geography and
arithmetic prove that 10,900 miles of converted railways cannot become an alternative
for 220,000 miles of roads. Journeys to reach them would be circuitous.
Conversion is not mentioned in “The Engineer” [5] from May
1955, when it reported the debate, until 31 January 1958, which reported the
newly formed Railway Conversion League. In 1958, thirteen – including six
League members - wrote supporting conversion, and 37 opposing it, including a
road engineer and two from railways. Between 1959 and 1967, seven people wrote
in favour (mostly League members), and twenty against. Interestingly, in
November 1957, it reported a conference on road congestion, which ignored
conversion, although some speakers had attended the 1955 debate.
He states that the width of a double-track railway tunnel is sufficient
for a two-way trunk road, but quotes no source, and ignores the width of
single-line tunnels, and the costly problem of ventilating and lighting
tunnels. Network Rail engineers told me, that without research, which is not
warranted, they cannot provide the width of the narrowest double-track tunnel.
Withrington wrote [6]: ‘the people who produced it [width and headroom
data] were engineers, ex-army’. ‘Ex-army officers’ in the
League [7] never claimed to have measured railways – it would have been
an impossible task. When The Engineer’s editor asked the proposers of
conversion to provide these - and other - details, a League member retorted
that government should do so! Conversionists base assumptions on a publication
specifying widths and heights required for passenger lines - first issued in
1858. It was not retrospective. By 1858, 9,542 route miles had opened [8],
largely between main centres and, thus, most of today’s 10,900 miles.
The League submitted plans to Ernest Marples’ [9] Special Advisory
Group in 1960. Marples rejected it: ‘The idea is open to insuperable
objections. The estimated cost is much too low and does not take account of
construction of junctions. Unless all over-bridges and tunnels are rebuilt, it
would be unusable by large vans or double-deck buses. It would require a very
high capital investment for very doubtful advantage. The possibility is not
ruled out of conversion of disused lines where the necessary widening can be
arranged.’
In 1970, the League published another plan, listing closed lines,
totalling 43.7 miles, ‘converted’ to roads. Lengths were from 109
yards, and averaged 1.47 miles. Some 8,000 miles had closed, including routes
over 100 miles long! Widening occurred in 48% cases, with single-lines widened
to 190 feet! A prediction that 112 routes totalling 211 miles would be
converted, I found, on contacting local authorities 35 years later, was limited
to 48 miles, and widening was commonplace.
An investigation in 1975 - praised by Withrington’s web-site,
“Transwatch” - was funded by the Department of the Environment
which rejected it, having ‘major reservations about some
calculations’.[10] It
focussed on a route from Liverpool Street station in London and five branches
– selected by the scheme’s author, who claimed it was the busiest
commuter line in the world.
Withrington claims that ‘all
In 1979, the League – renamed the Railway Conversion Campaign
– published new ‘plans’. In 1989, their advertisement urged
readers to call on MPs to promote the idea. No parliamentary action followed.
His web-site claims the case is already made, but his ‘Fact
Sheets’ contain flaws, e.g.
Sheet 2: “Railway
trespasser deaths would end with conversion”.
Trespass arises
because people take short cuts, which would continue after conversion –
but endangered by more traffic. Railway accidents are split into groups in
Ministry Inspectors’ Reports. One covers accidents on stations where no
train is involved. No comparable statistic exists for bus stations and
bus-stops. Instead of logically excluding those rail figures from his
comparisons, he creates a figure from a formula which cannot be designated as a
Fact.
Sheet 5: “Fuel
consumption assumes all railfreight involves a ten mile road journey at both
ends”.
Coal is
direct from port or colliery to power station, and other bulk flows have no
road journey at one or both ends.
Sheet 5: “No timetables
are compiled to assess bus fuel consumption”, a system operators would
reject.
Sheet 11: “Buses would
travel at an average of 60 or 65mph”.
That would
mean exceeding the 60mph maximum motorway limit for buses. Railways have 4362
level crossings [12], 2290 footpath crossings and thousands of flat junctions,
all of which would produce delays and casualties.
His claim that ‘thousands of acres of derelict railway land would
become valuable’ ignores millions of acres of unsold derelict sites,
where industry threw in the towel, because of wage levels, not road access problems.
In
He quotes haulage boss Sir Daniel Pettit, M.A, [13]: ‘the lorry
has come to the rescue of the city’. They destroy pavements, block
junctions, unload in streets, and damage walls! Sir Daniel did not quote any
scientific data or expert to support his personal views on environmental
pollution. In contrast, Stobarts - one of
There were other views on the effect of lorries on the environment from
independent sources:
The Civic Trust published damning criticisms. [15]
The Conservation Society criticised a Report on lorries by a Committee
set up by the Minister: ‘It contained the usual dreary recital of excuses
for damage to the environment by lorries. The Committee, chaired by Pettit,
says there should be greater co-operation between road, rail, sea & air
transport. It recommends “improved haulage driver training, enforcement
of lorry drivers’ hours and controls of car routes in cities, with
priority being given to freight”.[16] This attitude towards others is
typical of the haulage lobby.[17]
Seven MPs spoke at a conference, and none believed that lorries were
better for the environment than rail. One said that ‘uncontrolled public
transport was wasteful of resources and less efficient than BR’s
controlled track transport’. Another said ‘juggernauts are
destroying buildings’, arguing amid applause, ‘to move all heavy
traffic on rail which can carry all containers’. It was said that the
smoke and smell from lorries is intolerable.[18]
D. Hammett Chairman, Royal Institute of British Architects: ‘We
are failing to control existing lorries which are daily eroding the
environment’.[19]
Sir George Pickering FRS: ‘rail is safe, relatively clean, and
under-used; road is unsafe, relatively dirty and over-used. The cost to the
public, not only of road subsidies but in terms of loss of life, disability and
hospital treatment of the victims of road accidents is large’.[20]
Professor RH Tredgold (Professor of Physics): ‘It is generally
agreed world petroleum resources will be largely exhausted by the end of this
century. At that point, we will depend on nuclear energy and coal. Transport
will depend on electric traction. Trains will come into their own and replace
lorries for heavy transport.’[21]
Since 1954, 10,000 route miles of railway have closed, with only 250
‘converted’ using a very liberal interpretation of that word. If,
despite this catalogue of investigations, anyone wants another, let them pay
for it. Government hands out too much taxpayers’ money already. The
subject has been thoroughly researched, from 1954 to the present day, and shown
to be impractical.[22]
[1] Hansard, vol 543, col.1682
[2] Hansard, vol. 624, col. 1707. He said that closure ‘would
cause the gravest hardship’
[3] “The
Engineer’s” editor wrote that it was supported,
‘grudgingly’. None were road engineers or operators
[4] Railway conversion
– the impractical dream
[5] Birmingham Central
Library, ref BF 620.5
[6] To Norman Bradbury of
Railfuture, 24 December 2006
[7] League founder Lloyd and
League Chairman Dalgleish
[8] Board of Trade Returns
1858
[9] “A Minister of
Transport, who was not only road biased, but a successful road
contractor”. “Some,
like Marples had positive personal and financial incentives to see railways
close”, (D.Henshaw - The Great Railway Conspiracy, pages 110, 234)
[10] The Times 23 December
1975, and Hansard 4 February 1976. See Railway conversion – the
impractical dream, which reveals the impracticalities of this and other
proposals
[11] Journal of Transport
Economics & Policy, September 1973
[12] Office of Rail Regulator
- Railway Safety Report, 2007, page 30
[13] The Times 17 October
1972
[14] TRL PPR285, &
[15] Heavy Lorries, 1970
[16] The Times, 1 November
1973: ‘Lorries & the world we live in’
[17] John Wardroper in
Juggernaut: “in 1980, to alleviate the forecast decline in oil reserves,
the Road Haulage Association, backed by the Dept of Transport called for others
to cut oil consumption”
[18] The Times, 12 October
1972
[19] The Times 30 November
1970
[20] The Times, 12 November
1972
[21] The Times, 13 November
1972
[22] See Railway Conversion
– the impractical dream